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IXTOC I: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
POLLUTION INJURY
INTRODUCTION

On June 3, 1979, Ixtoc I, an offshore oil rig controlled by Pemex, 1
exploded. 2 The ensuing leak polluted the Gulf of Mexico with approximately 3,000,000 barrels of oil, making it the largest oil spill in
history. 3 Although the United States incurred relatively little dam-

1. Pemex (Petroleos Mexicanos) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Mexican
government. F.W. Stone Eng'r Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 14, 42 A.2d
57, 59 (1945); [1979] 10 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 765; see D'Angelo v. Petroleos
Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (D. Del. 1976) ("'[The Mexican government ...
), affd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977).
entered the oil business through Pemex ....
The rig was owned by a United States corporation, Sedco, Inc. The Impact of the
Blowout of the Mexican Oil Well Ixtoc I and the Resultant Oil Pollution on Texas and
the Gulf of Mexico: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries and the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Coona. on Public
Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ixtoc
Hearings] (statement of Stephen Mahood). Permargo (Perforaciones Marinas Del
Golfo, S.A.), a privately owned Mexican drilling company, had operated the rig since
August 1977. Id. At the time of the accident, Permargo was acting for Pemex under a
long-term offshore drilling contract. Id.
2. Ixtoc Hearings, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Stephen Mahood). On June
2, 1979, a -'major loss of circulation" occurred. Id. at 21, Permargo personnel on the
rig deferred a decision on what course to pursue to Pemex officials on shore, who,
after a few hours delay, decided to remove the drill and bit. Sedco personnel
strongly disagreed. Id. At 10:00 p.m. on June 2, 1979, the drill pipe was removed
and newly mixed mud was inserted to equalize pressure. The high pressure of the
pumped mud caused the drill collar to bend, making it impossible to shut off the flow
of mud. The mud was followed by oil and gas, which ignited and burned uncontrollably. The fire intensified, the spill began, and the rig was abandoned. id. at 21-22.
3. The rate of the leak was estimated at 30,000 barrels per day. Id. at 81 (statement of Adm. Paul Yost). Some early reports estimated that the leak had slowed to
approximately 10,000 barrels a day. [1979] 10 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 1597. Later disclosures, however, indicated that the flow was probably constant throughout the duration of the spill (30,000 barrels per day). [1980] 10 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 2252; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1980, § 1, at 15, col. 2. By December 1979, three months before it
was capped, Ixtoc I had spilled 136,000,000 gallons of oil (2,500,000 barrels), making
it twice the size of the Amoco Cadiz spill off the coast of Brittany, France, previously
the largest spill. [1980] 10 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 765. The well was finally capped on
March 23, 1980. Id. at 2252. By comparison, the Santa Barbara Channel blowout of
1969, which sparked a national movement for regulation of offshore drilling, leaked
only about 2,300,000 gallons (41,000 barrels). R. Easton. Black Tide 110 (1972). The
sheer size of the Ixtoc spill was compounded because the oil did not float in a
homogeneous state. Instead it dispersed as emulsion, [1979] 10 Envir. Rep. (BNA)
1033, 1597, a mixture of one liquid (oil) finely dispersed in another liquid (water). It
cost the United States an average of $75,000 to $85,000 a day to clean up the oil that
reached its shores. Ixtoc Hearings, supra note 1, at 90 (statement of Adm. Paul
Yost).
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age, 4 many individual United States nationals suffered severe injury
to both their homes and businesses 5 and deserve redress. 6 Any recovery from Pemex, which is wholly-owned by the Mexican government, 7 depends, however, on overcoming the traditional and still
formidable theory of state sovereignty. 8
The proliferation of offshore drilling ventures increases the possibility of future accidents 9 and of future litigation. This Note analyzes
4. Meteorologists and oceanographers believe that particularly favorable sea currents and wind patterns during the fall of 1979 prevented even more disastrous effects to the United States. [1980] 10 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 1200. N.Y. Times. Feb. 26.
1980, § 1, at 15, col. 3-4.
5. Ixtoc Hearings, supra note 1. at 108-19 (statement of Glen .McGehee). Four
types of injuries were sustained because of the Ixtoc I blowout: (1) damage to tourism
on the entire Texas Gulf coast; (2) damage to the environment, prinarily the Texas
coastal shelf, beaches, intertidal, and subtidal zones; (3) damage to en ironmiental
baselines such as the Texas Deepwater Port and the Offshore Continental Shelf Development; and (4) damage to the fishing industry and the costs of clean-up, Id. at
140. The total damages suffered were in excess of S580.000,000. N.Y. Times, May
23, 1980, § 1, at 17, col. 5.
6. Various suits brought by private individuals, the State of Texas, and the
United States Government have been consolidated in one action. In re Sedco Inc., Nos.
H-79-2157, H-79-1892, H-79-2389. H-79-2436 (S.D. Tex., filed July 1. 1900). see
note I supra.
7. See note I supra.
8. See generally J. Bodin, Six Livres de la Republique (4th ed. 1379). H. Laski.
The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (1968); C. Merriam, The History
and Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau (1900): Sovereignty Within the Law
Larson ed. 1965). Although not unknown to the Greek city states, the concept of
sovereignty emerged along with the modern structure of nations at the close of the
sixteenth century. D. Nincic, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the
Practice of the United Nations 2 n.2 (1970). Some early political thinkers advotated
absolute sovereignty, which would place no external restraints on the behavior of a
nation. E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations lxiii (1861). The modern relative theory of
sovereign immunity eclipsed this absolute theory, however, by arguing that every
nation is sovereign and free from intervention from other nations within the sphere of
its jurisdiction. This independence, however, is limited by the freedom and independence of other nations, as well as by international conventions and specific agreements among nations. C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law
11-14 (1928).
9. In 1976, 400 offshore units yielded 15% of the total world oil production.
Yashiro, Decelopment of Petroleum Resources in the Ocean, in Marine Technology
and Law 17, 23-24 (1978). Increasing demand and limited supply will probably lead
to increased offshore drilling as tie high price of oil makes the high cost of offshore
drilling economically feasible. For example, United States offshore oil production in
the Gulf of Mexico alone will increase from 414.185 barrels in 1970 to an estimated
741,443 barrels in 1985. Bureau of Mines, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Information
Circular 8575, Offshore Petroleum Studies 18 (1973). Increased production has been
accompanied by increased spills. In the first seven months of 1979, 513.000 tons of
oil were spilled; for the entire year of 1978, only 260,488 tons were spilled. [ 19791 10
Envir. Rep. (BNA) 992. Continually increasing exploitation of offshore oil seems inevitable given the .widespread public and private enthusiasm. For example. Congress
has expressly encouraged domestic offshore development particularly in the Atlantic
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the adequacy of the mechanisms for redress available to those injured
by transnational oil pollution. Whether redress is sought internationally through the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) ° or in the
United States through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,1 1 the
conflict is between an injured party's right to compensation and the
nation's exclusive right to judge activities within its sovereign territory. Part I considers the potential for pursuing a claim in the I.C.J.;
Part II examines the application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act in United States courts. The Ixtoc I spill is merely a specific
example; the discussion applies to other transboundary pollution incidents involving injured American nationals and a foreign nation defendant.
I. SUIT IN INTERNATIONAL COURT

A. Transboundary Pollution Rule of Law
Over the last several decades, international custom has required
that nations be responsible for government controlled activities that
cause damage to other nations.': Under traditional rules of national
Ocean and Gulf of Alaska. See 'Ad Hoc Select Comm. on the Outer Continental
Shelf, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Study on the Effects of Offshore Oil and Natural Gas
Development 4 (Comm. Print 1976). Plans already are made for United States drilling companies to provide 120 drilling rigs to Mexico in the next 10 years. N.Y.
Times, January 28, 1979, § 1, at 16, col. 2. Furthermore, at least 30 nations are
producing from offshore wells, and 40 others are in the process of developing offshore
capabilities, Yashiro, supra, at 23-24.
10. The I.C.J. is the successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(P.C.I.J.) created by the League of Nations. Compare U.N. Charter art. 7, para. I
with League of Nations Covenant art. 14. The process for the management of tile
I.C.J. is set forth in the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter arts. 92-96. To insure impartiality, no member of the Court may exercise any political or administrative function or
engage in any occupation or profession while sitting. Stat. I.C.J. art. 16, para. 1,
reprinted in W. Bishop, International Law 923 (2d ed. 1962). The I.C.J. has 15
judges, with regular elections of five judges every three years; id. art. 13, para. 1,
reprinted in W. Bishop, supra, at 923; no two members may be nationals of the
same nation. Id. art. 3, para. 1, reprinted in W. Bishop, supra, at 921. Candidates
must be elected by a majority of both the General Assembly and the Security Council to ensure a cross representation of various nations. Id. art. 10, reprinted in W.
Bishop, supra, at 922. See generally S. Rosenne, The International Court of Justice
(2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as S. Rosenne 1961].
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2),(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
12. The concept of national responsibility was patterned after notions of how individuals should act in society. W. Hall, A Treatise on International Law 1 (6th ed.
1909). Our modern system of international responsibility recognizes liability for international injuries. 1 H. Lauterpacht, International Law 383-84 (1970). The doctrine
of sovereignty traditionally discouraged the imposition of liability unless grounded in
a nation's consent by treaty, ruleS of law, or custom. Id. at 384. The scope of these
sources, however, has expanded dramatically in recent years with a corresponding
expansion of the principles of national responsibility. C. Eagleton, supra note 8, at
207-08. As a result, it is clear that nations are responsible for injuries they inflict on
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responsibility, direct damage to the property of another nation creates
a duty to redress the injury.13 Although no specific multilateral convention explicitly imposes liability for transnational pollution injuries
resulting from offshore drilling,"4 an international court will discern a
general international rule from other sources 15 and apply that rule to
the specific situation.' 6 In the transboundary pollution situation, reother nations. W. Bishop, supra note 10, at 636-704; C. Eagleton, supra note 8, at
21; A. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice 15,
22-27 (1970); H. Lauterpacht, supra, at 401.
13. See C. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 74-75 (1967),
C. Eagleton, supra note 8, at 51, 80, 103; Bleicher. An Ocerriew of International
Environmental Regulation, 2 Ecology L.Q. 1. 11, 25 (1972). Handl, Territorial
Sovereignty and the Problem of TransnationalPollution. 69 Am. J. Int'l L. 50, 75-76
(1975).
14. A multilateral convention involves the same formalities and imposes the same
obligations as any other treaty. Nations adopt. sign. ratify. or accede to the treaty.
See generally I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 582-613 (2d cd.
1973). The need for a universal convention governing transuational pollution injury
from offshore mining activities is reflected by the plethora of regional and bipartite
treaties created for various other environmental problems. See. e.g.. Treaty Banning
Nuclear Tests, Aug. 5, 1963, United States-United Kingdom-Soviet Union, 14 U.S.T.
1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433; The Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19. 1960. Pakistan-India,
419 U.N.T.S. 125, reprinted in 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 797 (1961); Agreement for Full
Utilization of the Nile, Nov. 8, 1959, United Arab Republic-Sudan, 45.3 U.N.T.S. 51,
Agreement Relating to the St. Lawrence Seaway, Feb. 27. 1959, United StatesCanada, 10 U.S.T. 383, T.I.A.S. No. 4199; Act Between the States of the Niger
Basin, done Oct. 26, 1963, 587 U.N.T.S. 9. Many commentators have advocated a
comprehensive treaty. See, e.g., J. Barros & D. Johnston, The International Law of
Pollution xv (1974); Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, 13 Nat. Resources J. 179, 179 (1973); Kutner. The Control
and Prevention of Transnational Pollution: A Case .for World Habeas Ecologicus, 9
Law. Americas 2"957, 279 (1977); Nanda. The Establishment of internationalStandards
for Transnational Environmental Injury, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 1089, 1101-08 (1975);
Neuman, Oil on Troubled Waters: Tire InternationalControl of Marine Pollution, 2
J. Mar. L. & Com. 349, 352 (1971). Even the U.N. Secretary-General has stated that
"'investigation and control of marine ... pollution . .. is a matter on which international action on both regional and global scales is now becoming urgent." U.N. Doe.
E/4487,
278 (1968). See generally U.N. Conference on the Human Environment,
June 16, 1972, principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48114 and Corr. I, reprinted in 11
Int'l Legal Materials 1420 (1972) (responsibility of nations not to injure the environment of other nations), endorsed, G.A. Res. 2996, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. {No. 30)
42, U.N. Doc. ACONF. 48/14 (1972) (reported in D. Djanovieh, United Nations
Resolutions 278-79 (1978)).
15. I. Brownlie, supra note 14, at 19-23. D. O'Connell, International Law 28-29
(1965). "[Ihf an international tribunal is unable to discover an existing treaty or customary rule relevant to the dispute, in theory at least the conclusion seems inescapable that the rule which the tribunal adopts . . .is a new rule of international law.'"
D. Greig, International Law 31-33 (1970); see Stat. I.C.J. art. 38(D), reprinted in W.
Bishop, supra note 10, at 926; S. Rosenne, The World Court 25 (3d rev. ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as S. Rosenne 1973].
16. Because of lack of precedent, "the international judge (may have to] resort to
general notions of justice and equity in deducing the new rule or in refining an
existing rule." D. Greig, supra note 15, at 27. Moreover. the court is "at liberty to
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sponsibility under international law is derived principally
from two
17
sources, judicial decisions and treaties and conventions.
1. Judicial Decisions
The leading case on transboundary pollution is the Trail Smelter
Arbitration (United States v. Canada),18 which concerned American property damaged by emissions of sulphur dioxide from a smelter
in British Columbia.' 9 Initially, a Canadian-United States International Joint Commission determined that past damage should be
redressed. 2 0 As the pollution continued, the two countries formed a
tribunal to determine present and future damages. 2 1 The tribunal
22
established an administrative organization to regulate the smelter
and determined that
under the principles of international law ... no [nation] has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
adopt the principle which it considers best calculated to ensure the administration of
justice, most suited to procedure before an international tribunal and most in conformity with the fundamental principles of international law." Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 16. See generally H. Lauterpacht, The
Development of International Law by the International Court 155-72 (1958); S.
Rosenne 1961, supra note 10, at 420-29.
17. The Statute of the I.C.J. lists four primary sources of international law: "(a)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; [and] (d) . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations . . . ." Stat. I.C.J. art. 38, reprinted in W. Bishop,
supra note 10, at 926. For organizational purposes, only international conventions
and judicial decisions will be separately discussed in this Note. International custom
and general principles are, in part, composed of the two previous sources, I.
Brownlie, supra note 14, at 4-5, and hence, are not separately treated. The teachings
of publicists also will not be separately discussed because the influence of publicists
permeates any discussion of international law. Although some commentators question
the use of teachings of international publicists by the Court, see D. Greig, supra
note 15, at 41, various cases use their teachings. See Temple of Preah Vihear, [19621
I.C.J. 6, 39 (Alfaro, J.); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, [19501 I.C.J. 221, 235 (Read, J., dissenting); International Status of
South-West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128, 153 (McNair, J.); Diversion of Water from the
Meuse, [1937] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70, at 76-77 (Hudson, J.). For this reason, this
Note mentions support by international publicists within the context of the judicial
decisions and conventions.
18. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938).
19. Id. at 1917. In 1930, the smelter at Trail emitted between 330 and 350 tons
of sulphur daily. Id.
20. The International Joint Commission awarded $350,000 and provided that filture damages be adjusted by the owner of the smelter or the governments. Future
damages were never adjusted by the company, nor determined by the governments.
Id. at 1918-19.
21. Id. at 1907. The tribunal found damages for the period from 1932-1937 to be
$78,000. Id. at 1931.
22. Id. at 1934.
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to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another [nation]
or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.23
The rationale of Trail Smelter has been applied uniformh' in
diplomatic settlements involving extraterritorial environmental damage resulting from
radiation, 24 noxious odors, 25 and interference with
26
riparian rights.
In Corfu Channel,2 7 the I.C.J. implicitly accepted the Trail Smelter reasoning by extending national responsibility to include acti-vities
occurring within a nation's territory that cause injury to foreign nationals. 2 8 In Corfu, British seamen were injured when their vessel
23. Id. at 1965. The tribunal undermined any potential argument that Canada's
duty derived solely from the convention and, therefore, its decision would have little
precedential value. "Considering the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal holds
that the Dominion of Canada is responsible . . .for the conduct of the Trail Smelter.
Apart from the undertakings in the Convention, it is, therefore, the duty . . . of
Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in conformity with . . international
law as herein determined." Id. at 1965-66.
24. See Nanda, supra note 14, at 1101. In 1954. the United States, while conducting hydrogen bomb tests in the Marshall Islands under a United Nations Trusteeship, exposed the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel to excessive levels of radiation.
The United States agreed to pay two million dollars as compensation for the injury.
The significance of the settlement is that it creates an expectation that a nation is
responsible for pollution damage and should therefore make reparations. Id. at 109S.
In 1958, the United States and Japan exchanged diplomatic correspondence concerning the prospective damage from nuclear tests conducted near the Marshall Islands.
After Japan asserted that the United States should be solely responsible. the United
States agreed to make reparations for all substantial damages. 4 M. Whiteman. Digest of International Law 578-86 (1963). When Australia requested I.C.J. action to
prevent resumption of French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. the I.C.J.'s dissent
noted that "each state is free to act as it thinks fit \vithin the limits of its sovereignty,
and in the event of genuine damage or injury, if the said damage is clearly established, it owes reparation to the state having suffered that damage." Nuclear Tests.
[1973] I.C.J. 99, 131 (Ignatio-Pinto. J.,dissenting on jurisdictional grounds).
25. See 6 M. Whiteman, supra note 24. at 256-57.
26. Lac Lanoux (Spain v. France), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957) tin French
only). Spain objected to a French plan to divert \waters of Lake Lanoux into the
Ariege river for use in a hydroelectric plant. The tribunal declined to rule on the
question because no Spanish interests had been injured. The tribunal did state, however, that any French act injiuring Spanish interests would support a claim, Id. at
308.
27. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 7: see I L. Oppenheim. international Law 343 (8th ed. H.
Lauterpaucht 1955).
28. Corfi is cited to support the proposition that knowledge of potential polluters
imputes to the sovereign controlling the territory responsibility for transnational pollution injury. See, e.g., Bleicher, supra note 13, at 17-18; Goldie. Liability for Damage and the Progressive Decelopment of InternationalLamw. 14 Int'l & Cmnp. L.Q.
1189, 1226-31 (1965); Holstein, State Responsibility and the Late o International
Watercourses, 7 Law. Americas 535, 5344 (1975): Lester, Ricer Pollution in International Late, 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 828, 839-40 (1963).
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collided with mines in the Strait of Corfu and sank.2 9 The I.C.J. held
Albania responsible for the protection of nationals of other countries
from dangerous conditions within its jurisdiction. 3" The Court held
that the laying of the mine field could not have been accomplished
"without the knowledge of the Albanian Government" 3 1 and that
every nation has the "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to
32
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other [nations]."
2. Treaties and Conventions
Progressively stricter notions of nation responsibility for pollution
damages have developed in the last fifty years through treaties and
conventions. 3 3 Early conventions primarily sought to limit oil discharge from large ships. 34 To secure signatories, however, these
conventions did not completely prohibit oil discharge or impose liability. 3 5 Rather, the nation of registry determined what fines the ship

29. [19491 I.C.J. at 12-13.
30. Id. at 36.
31. Id. at 22.
32. Id. This rationale is largely supported by international jurists and commentators. See U.N. Secretariat Survey of International Law, U.N. Doe. A/CN. 4/l/Rev.
1, at 34-35 (1949); W. Bishop, supra note 10, at 344; C. Hyde, International Law 725
(2d rev. ed. 1947); C. Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 408 (1969);
Bleicher, supra note 13, at 16-30; Coldie, supra note 28, at 1226-32; Hoffman, State
Responsibility in InternationalLaw and Transboundary Pollution Injuries, 25 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 509, 513-20 (1976); Holstein, supra note 28, at .544. Kelson, State Re'
sponsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 1.3 Harv. Int'l L.J. 197, 235-38
(1972); Kutner, supra note 14, at 279; Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, I Can. Y.B.
Int'l L. 213, 213-29 (1963); Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Sinelter Arbitration,
50 Ore. L. Rev. 259, 281-82 (1971); Teclaff, InternationalLaw and the Protectionof the
Oceans from Pollution, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 529, 545 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Teclaff I]; Teclaff, The Impact of Environmental Concern on the Development of
International Law, 13 Nat. Resources J. 357, 370 (1973).
33. See J. Barros & D. Johnston, supra note 14, at 200-62; Teclaff I, supra note
32, at 532-41.
34. In 1926, the United States held the first international convention on pollution, the Washington Conference. The United States delegate urged a complete prohibition of oil discharge from ships. Shepard & Mann, Reducing the Menace of Oil
Pollution, 31 Dep't State Bull. 311, 311 (1954). The draft convention, however, was
halfheartedly endorsed and simply enabled nations to create contiguous zones where
discharge from ships could be prohibited. Final Act of the Preliminary Conference on
Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, Annex art. 1, reprinted in I U.S. Dep't of State,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1926, at 238, 2,15
(1941). For a history of conventions regulating pollution from ships, see Higgins,
Pollution: International Conventions, Federal and State Legislation, 53 Tul. L. Rev.
1328 (1979).
35. In 1954, under British initiative, the first generally accepted convention restricting oil pollution was signed. International Convention for the Prevention of Pol-
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owner should pay. 36 The 1958 Convention on the High Seas 37 introduced the concept of nation responsibility for offshore mining, but
did not impose liability for violating guidelines set forth in the convention. 38 A more recent international convention imposes liability
on owners of polluting vessels. The Brussels Convention on Civil
Liability
for Oil Pollution from Ships 3 9 establishes limited strict liabil40
ity and gives jurisdiction to the courts of the nation in which the
injury occurs. 4 1 Offshore mining pollution, however, is not expressly
42

covered.

Other international environmental developments couple principles
of national responsibility with liability for offshore mining accidents.
The 1976 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages
from Offshore Operations 43 imposes strict liability on offshore instal-

lution of the Sea by Oil, opened for signature May 12. 1954. 12 U.S.T. 2989.
T.I.A.S. No. 4900. This convention merely substituted a reduction of permissible
discharge for the absolute bar proposed in the 1926 initiative. Id. art. IlI. 12 U.S.T.
at 2992. Although amendments in 1962 decreased the permissible discharge, tile
standard still fell far short of the standards of the 1926 initiative. See id.art. 1II(alqb)
(1970 amendments), reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal Materials 1. 3-4 (1970). adopted, International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Apr. 11,
1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109.
36. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
art. VI, done Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109.
37. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958. 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200.
38. Id. art. 24, 13 U.S.T. at 2319 ("Every State shall draw up regulations to
prevent pollution of the seas . . . resulting from the exploitation and exploration of
the seabed and its subsoil ....").The convention merely restated the duty of a
nation to control pollution; a duty was imposed "to prevent pollution of the seas by
the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines." Id., 13 U.S.T. at 2319. A nation whose
regulation falls below a certain standard violates international law and is subject to
penalties. Id., 13 U.S.T. at 2319. Because of imprecise standards, however, no
method exists to determine compliance with the convention. Teclaff I, supra note 32,
at 534.
39. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done
November 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal Materials 45 (1970).
40. Id. art. III, reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal Materials at 47 ("[T~he owner of a ship
at the time of an incident ...shall be liable for an) pollution damage caused by oil
which has escaped or been discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.").
41. Id. art. IX, reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal Materials at 56 ("Where an incident has
caused pollution damage in the territory' including the territorial sea of one or more
Contracting States . . .actions for compensation may only be brought in the Courts
of any such Contracting State or States.").
42. See id., reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal Materials at 56.
43. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources [hereinafter cited as 1976
Seabed Treaty], reprinted in 16 Int'l Legal Materials 1450 (1977). see Dubais, The
1976 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Dainagefrom Offshore
Operations, 9 J. Mar. L. & Coin. 61 (1977)

412

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

lation operators for pollution damages to a contracting party. 44 Unfortunately, the convention is regional and only nations bordering the
4
8
North Sea, Baltic Sea, or North Atlantic Ocean may accede to it.
46
The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,
although
not contractually binding, requires that nations prevent activities
within their jurisdiction or control from causing environmental damage to 8other nations. 47 Again, no mechanism for redress is pro4
vided.
The most important development in the area of transnational pollution is the United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). 49 Although still in draft form, UNCLOS reflects the international concern for having nations redress transnational pollution
injuries. If and when this convention is approved, polluters of
areas (including the marine environment) under the jurisdiction of
other [nations] . . . [will be] liable to other [nations] for such damage. The "activities" of concern may thus originate on land or any-

44.
rials at
45.
46.

1976 Seabed Treaty, supra note 43, art. 3, reprinted in 16 Int'l Legal Mate1452.
Id. art. 18, reprinted in 16 Int'l Legal Materials at 1455.
Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF. 48/14, 5-7 (1972), reprinted in 11 Int'l Legal Materials 1416 (1972). See
generally Mendelsohn, Ocean Pollution and the 1972 United Nations Conference on
the Environment, 3 J. Mar. L. & Com. 385 (1972); Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment, 14 Harv. Int'l L.J. 423 (1973).
47. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, principle 21,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 Int'l Legal Materials at
1420. Mexican acceptance of national responsibility for environmental injury caused
to other nations is clearly reflected in the stateinent of the Mexican delegate to the
General Assembly's Second Committee on principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.
.'[T]he responsibility of all states is to avoid activities within their jurisdiction or
control which might cause damage to the environment beyond their national frontiers
and to repair the damage caused." 27 U.N. GAOR, Second Committee (1470th mtg.)
158, U.N. Doc. A/C 2/SR. 1470 (1972) (statement of Gonzfilez Martinez).
48. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF. 48/14, reprinted in 11 Int'l Legal Materials at 1416.
49. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 (1977), reprinted in 16 Int'l Legal Materials
1108 (1977). This convention will provide that -1.States are responsible for the frilfillment of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation
of the marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance with international law
for damage attributable to them resulting from violations of these obligations. 2.
States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems
for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by
pollution of the marine environment by persons, natural or juridical, under their
jurisdiction. 3. States shall co-operate in the development of international law relating to criteria and procedures for the determination of liability, the assessment of
damage, the payment of compensation and the settlement of related disputes." Id.
art. 236, reprinted in 16 Int'l Legal Materials at 1189. "States have the obligation to
protect and preserve the marine environment." Id. art. 193, reprinted in 16 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1176.
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where at sea, including flag ships and sea bed installations, and the
[nation]
is responsible whether the enterprise is public or pri50
vate.

When accepted, UNCLOS will provide the binding contractual force
of a treaty, making it unnecessary to infer an international rule on
transboundary pollution. 5A
Present international law evidences the well accepted practice of
imposing liability on a nation inflicting pollution damage on another
nation. Thus, if the I.C.J., or any other tribunal, were to rule on
transboundary oil pollution, such as that caused by Ixtoc I, the nation
controlling the rig would be liable for damages. A clear rule of law,
however, is not sufficient to ensure that the claim will be adjudicated.
B. Suit in the I.C.J.
1. Preliminary Considerations in the I.C.J.
Traditionally, a nation resorts to the I.C.J. only after diplomatic
negotiations and arbitration have failed. 52 Before suit is commenced,
50. D. Livingston, Marine Pollution Articles in the Law of the Sea Single Informal Negotiating Text 23 (1976).
51. The UNCLOS text, as presently written, makes transboundary polluters liable for the injury they' cause. UNCLOS is probably the greatest multilateral undertaking in history because it seeks to provide rules for 'ever possible issue involving
relations between nations with respect to the oceans. stuch as fishing. national jurisdiction, navigation, environment, scientific research, seabed exploitation, and transfer
of technology." Charnev, United States Interests in a Convention on the Lair of the
Sea: The Casefor Conutnued Efforts, 11 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 39. 39 t1978). Unlike
the past two Law of the Sea Conferences, this conference intends to establish a
regime that will resolve problems as they' arise. Ganz. The United Nations and The
Laic of the Sea, 26 Int'l & Conp. L.Q. 1. 2 (1977). The pollution provisions largely
are finalized and merely await conclusion of the entire treaty. Bernhardt. A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Prescriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the
Law of the Sea Conference, 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 265. 265 (1980). Many feel that the
overall convention will be concluded in the near future. N.Y. Times. Apr. 7. 1980. §
1, at 18, col. I (an initial list of 100 problems has been reduced to fewer than a
dozen).
52. The U.N. Charter impliedly suggests that negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration be used before judicial settlement. See U.N. Charter art. 3.3.
para. 1. The failure of negotiations concerning the Ixtoc I spill is likely because
Mexico disclaims responsibility. [1979] 10 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 1075. 1279, 1353-&4.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1979, § 1. at 5, col. 1. see J. Siqueiros. La Responsibilidad Ciril
de Petroleos Mexicanos en el Caso del Pozo lxtoc-l. El Foro. Julio-Septiembre 1979.
at 58 CA la luz del Derecho Internacional Ptblico. en su etapa actual en el caso de
Ixtoc I, no existe responsibilidad del Estado mexicano para indeminizar los posibles
danos sufridos por gobiernos extranjeros, o por entidades publicas o privadas de otro
Estado.") (The Mexican government, under present international law applied to the
specific facts of the [Ixtoc I spill], does not have the responsibility to indemnify public or private entities of a foreign nation for damages incurred. (translation by the
Fordham Law Review)).
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however, other requirements must be met. In a suit brought by a
nation on behalf of its nationals, 53 a nation must prove that the individual is in fact a national 54 and that the local remedies of the defendant nation have been exhausted. 55 Additionally, whether a nation

53. Espousal and settlement of claims for injuries sustained from a foreign nation
is not a matter of legal right. 8 M. Whiteman, supra note 24, at 1216; Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 212 (1965). Generally,
when the State Department decides to espouse a claim and the claim is successful,
the lump sum awarded is distributed in compliance with relevant federal statutes. 8
M. Whiteman, supra note 24, at 1219; Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 214 (1965). The primary distribution statute is the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1627 (1976), which established the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to distribute lump sum awards.
Id. § 1622. The decision whether to espouse a national claim and the amount distributed upon settlement, however, can be constitutionally challenged. See Phelps v.
McDonald, 99 U.S. 298 (1878) (bankrupt claimed government paid damages set by
international commission to wrong party); Aris Cloves, Inc. v. United States, 420
F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (failure to espouse claim); Meade v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl.
224 (1866) (right to release claims of nationals), aff'd on other grounds, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 691 (1869). See generally Note, Constitutional Issues in the Settlement of
Property Claims Against Foreign States, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1091 (1975).
54. The nationality rule requires that "from the time of the occurrence of the
injury until the making of the award the claim must.. . have belonged to a person or to
a series of persons (a) having the nationality of the State by whom it is put forward,
and (b) not having the nationality of the State against whom it is put forward."
2 L. Oppenheim, supra note 27, at 347-48; accord, e.g., Barcelona Traction Light &
Power Co., [1964] I.C.J. 6; Nottebohm, [1955] I.C.J. 4; Panevezys-Saldutsikis Ry.,
[1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B No. 76; 8 M. Whiteman, supra note 24, at 1233-34. The
nationality principle ensures a sufficient connection between the plaintiff nation and
the injured individual. Nottebohm, [1955] I.C.J. 4, 23 This nationality must be established before the plaintiff nation has a viable legal interest in the claim. G.
Schwarzenberger, International Law 589-91, 611 (3d ed. 1957); H. Van Panhuys, The
Role of Nationality in International Law 59 (1959). See generally 5 G. Hackworth,
Digest of International Law §§ 541-546 (1943); C. Joseph, Nationality and Diplomatic
Protection (1969); H. Van Panhuys, supra; Borchard, The Protection of Citizens
Abroad and Change of OriginalNationality, 43 Yale L.J. 359 (1934); Koessler, Government Espousal of Private Claims Before Internitional Tribunals, 13 U. Chli. L. Rev.
180 (1946).
55. The exhaustion of local remedies rule is also called the rule of local redress.
Generally, the rule compels an individual to seek redress in the injuring nation's
courts before the injured party's government can pursue a claim on the national's
behalf. The doctrine has ancient roots, 3 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis § V(I)
(1919), and is regularly applied today. E.g., Barcelona Traction, [1964] I.C.J. 6; Interhandel, [1959] I.C.J. 6, 11, 27; Nottebohm, [1955] I.C.J. 4, 7-8; Ambatielos,
[1953] I.C.J. 10, 13; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., [1952] I.C.J. 93, 99; Phosphates of
Morocco, [1938] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 74, at 14: Administration of the Prince Von
Pless, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 54, at 151; Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions,
[1925] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 5, at 45. The rule, however, may not apply in at least
four situations: (1) when a declaratory judgment is sought, see German Interests In
Polish Upper Silesia, [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 6, at 12-13; (2) when it is waived in
a compronis or treaty, see notes 61-62 infra; (3) when a party is estopped from
asserting it, see Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. 9, 17; or (4) when the local remedy
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asserts its nationals' claims or sues in its own behalf, the I.C.J. must
have "contentious" jurisdiction over the parties. 56
2. Contentious Jurisdiction
A nation may reject the contentious or "personal" jurisdiction of
the I.C.J. on the ground that no court or nation has the right to pass
judgment on the exercises of sovereign authority. 57 This defense ef-

is not effective or when it would be obviously futile to seek redress in the foreign
nation's courts. See Finnish Ships Owners (Finland v. Great Britain). 3 R. Int'l
Awards 1479, 1544 (1934). See generally C. Ainerasinghe. supra note 13, at 169-267
(1967); C. Eagleton, supra note 8, at 95-124; T. Haesler, The Exhaustion of Local
Remedies in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals 51-53 0196.}, Borchard, The Local Remedy Rule, 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 729. 730 (1934), Mumnmer. Ti
Content of the Duty to Exhaust Local Judicial Remedies, 54 Am. J. lnt'l L. 39. 39.
(1964). Many, however, feel that the local redress requirement may not be necessary
in the transnational pollution injury situation. F. Garcia Amador. L. Sohn & R. Baxter, Convention on International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (Draft
N.12 with explanatory notes) (1974). Bleicher. supra note 13. at 25. "Since the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies would be peculiarly burdensome where
the individual plaintiff had been injured by out-of-state pollution the wrong complained of is held to incur state-to-state responsibility, and exhaustion of local remedies is not required." Lester. supra note 28. at 849: accord. Hoffman. supra note
32, at 538. "Indeed, insistence on the application of the local remedies rule in a
transnational pollution context would violate basic considerations of equity as many
pollution victims might find it simply beyond their means to engage in the costly and
complex pursuit abroad of compensation." Ixtoc Hearings, supra note 1, at 263
(statement of Gfinther Handl).
56. Stat. I.C.J. art. 36, para. 2,reprinted in W. Bishop, supra note 10. at 926.
Contentious jurisdiction is analogous to personal jurisdiction in United States law
because it creates jurisdiction over the parties to the action. Unlike personal jurisdiction, contentious jurisdiction is based solely on consent; appearance before the I.C.J.
depends exclusively on the will of the parties. See Monetary Gold. [1954] I.C.J. 19.
32; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.. [1952] I.C.J. 93. 100-03. jurisdiction. however, is not
unilaterally revocable once consent is given. the court has the power to determine
whether jurisdiction exists. "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." Stat. l.C.J. art.
36, para. 6, reprinted in W. Bishop, supra note 10, at 926. see Nottebohin. [19.531
I.C.J. 111, 119-20 (Preliminary Objections). See generally I. Shihata. Tie Power of
the International Court to Determine its Own jurisdiction (196.5).
57. W. Bishop, supra note 10, at 63; J. Brierly. The law of Nations 149 (1955.
The underlying premise for rejecting the scrutiny of one nation's activity by another
nation or other international authority is the principle that nations are equal. R.
Klein, Sovereign Equality Among States 143-44 (1974). The Charter of the United
Nations expressly incorporates this concept. U.N. Charter art. 2. para. I ('The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."P.
The United Nations' respect for national sovereignty is manifested in article 2M71,
which expressly rejects U.N. power to intervene in matters within the exclusive
jurisdiction of member nations. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. The United States has
long accepted this traditional rule. The Antelope. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66. 122 (1825)
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fectively precludes a plaintiff nation from compelling appearance of' a
defendant nation before the I.C.J. Consequently, contentious jurisdiction can only be obtained by express or tacit consent of the nations
that are parties to the action. 58 This consent requirement, however,
does not render the I.C.J. powerless. Approximately sixty cases have
been adjudicated by the I.C.J., and its rulings have been obeyed by
59
the party nations.
A nation may consent to the Court's jurisdiction in two ways. First,
a nation may, by a provision in a treaty, concede jurisdiction over
disputes arising out of the subject matter of the treaty 60 or make the
("No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect
equality of nations . . . . It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on
itself alone."). See generally E. Dickinson, The Equality of States in International
Law (1920); P. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States (1964).
58. Absent some previous consent, an "individual nation remains the supreme
authority for deciding whether and under what conditions to submit a dispute to
international adjudication, and no other nation can summon it before an international
court without its consent. . . . Here again, decentralization of international adjudication is but another term for national sovereignty in respect to the judicial function."
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 301 (4th ed. 1967); S. Rosenne 1961, supra
note 10, at 260. Without consent, international jurisdiction will not lie. See Rights of
Nationals of the United States in Morocco, [1952] I.C.J. 176; Eastern Carella, [19231
P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5, at 28; S. Rosenne 1961, supra note 10, at 260. In limited
situations, tacit consent is acceptable. See Minority Schools, [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. A.
No. 64, at 24 ("The consent of a state to the submission of a dispute to the Court
may not only result from an express declaration, but may also be inferred from acts
conclusivelv establishing it."). Generally, this tacit consent is inferred when the parties plead the merits of*the claim without objecting to the Court's lack of jurisdiction.
S. Rosenne 1961, supra note 10, at 296.
59. No specific mechanism compels recalcitrant nations to comply with the judgments of the I.C.J. Nations only consent to a good faith adjustment of their disputes
and good faith compliance with the decision is assumed. Supplementing this moral
directive, the Charter of the United Nations specifies not only that each member
must comply with the decisions of the I.C.J., but that when a nation refuises to
comply, the other party may seek assistance from the Security Council. U.N. Charter
art. 94. Because only one nation, Albania, has failed to honor the I.C.J.'s judgment,
see S. Rosenne 1973, supra note 15, at 40, parties to international disputes never use
this provision. Id.Even if this practice were to change, however, the political motivations of the Security Council members make effective utilization of article 94 unlikely. Id.
60. Compulsory jurisdiction is effected by a compromissory clause in a treaty,
convention, or note. Approximately 223 agreements containing compromissory
clauses are deposited .,ith the Secretary-General of the United Nations. [1978-1979]
I.C.J.Y.B. 87-102 (1979). Jurisdiction often is predicated on these clauses. See Northern Cameroons, [1963] I.C.J. 15 (jurisdiction based on article in trusteeship agreement); Monetary Gold, [1954] I.C.J. 19 (jurisdiction based on statements of the parties to submit to the I C.J.); Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, [19251 P.C.I.J..
ser. A, No. 5 (jurisdiction based on Mandates of the League of Nations which included compromissory clauses). See generally Note, Jurisdictionof the International
Court of Justice under Compromissory Clauses in Exchange Notes, 67 Am. J. lnt'l L.
563 (1973).
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acceptance of jurisdiction the very substance of the treaty.,
Second,
a nation may accept the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction unilaterally w ith a declaration to the Court creating "compulsory" jurisdiction 6 over disputes
concerning treaties, questions of international law, breaches of inter63
national obligations, and reparations for such breaches.
Many nations have signed declarations of compulsory jurisdiction,"
including both the United States 65 and Mexico. 6 6 Many of these

61. E.g., Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906,
[1960] I.C.J. 192, 194 (Washington Agreement of July 21. 1957). Sovereignty Over
Frontier Lands, [1959] I.C.J. 209, 231 (Special Agreement of March 7, 1957). Miquiers and Ecrehos, [1953] I.C.J. 47, 49 (Special Agreement of December 29. 1950).
Corfu Channel, [1949] I.C.J. 4. 6 (Special Agreement of March 3. 1948). The S.S.
Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 5 (Agreement of January 4. 1927). Nations
may also submit a wide variety of disputes to the Court for adjudication. See Hava de
la Torre, [1951] I.C.J. 71 (Protocol of Friendship and Cooperation, May 24. 1934,
Colombia-Peru); Electricity Co. of Sofia & Bulgaria, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. AIB, No. 77
(Treaty of Conciliation Arbitration and Judicial Settlement, June 23. 1931. BelgiumBulgaria).
62. U.N. member nations may unilaterally accept as compulsory the jurisdiction
of the I.C.J. Stat. I.C.J. art. 36, para. 2, reprinted in W. Bishop. sipra note 10, at
926. See generally Owen, Conpulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice: A Study of Its Acceptance by Nations, 3 Ca. L. Rev. 704 t1969.
63. Stat. I.C.J. art. 36, para. 2, reprinted in \V. Bishop. supra note 10, at 926.
64. To date, 45 of 138 nations have accepted compulsory jurisdiction. [1978-1979]
I.C.J.Y.B. 56-86 (1979). Of the 60 cases brought before the l.C.J.. 14 were brought
under the compulsory power of the Court. including some of the most politically
significant. S. Rosenne 1973, supra note 15. at 73. In 1979, the folloing nations had
accepted compulsory jurisdiction: Australia, Austria, Belgium. Botswna. Canada.
Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Campuchea (Cambodia), Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Gambia, Haiti, Honduras, India. Israel. Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi. Malta. Mauritius, Mexico.
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway. Pakistan, Panama. Philippines, Portugal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland. Sweden, Switzerland. Uganda, United
Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. [1978-1979] I.C.J.Y.B. 56-86 t1979i.
65. 61 Stat. 1218 (1947). T.I.A.S. No. 1598. The most important sections of the
U.S. declaration are the reservations, which state that "'this declaration shall not
apply to (a) disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals
by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or (b) disputes with regard to matters which are essenitially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America; or (c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (l allparties to the
treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court. or t2) the
United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction." Id.
66. [1978-1979] I.C.J.Y.B. 75 (1979). "'In regard to any legal dispute that ma% in
[the] future arise between the United States of Mexico and an other State out of
events subsequent to the date of this Declaration, the Mexicam Government recognizes as compulsory ipso facto . . .the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2. of the Statute ... This Declaration,
... does not apply to disputes arising from matters that. in the opinion of the Mexican Government, are within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of Mexico
.... Id.
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unilateral declarations, however, are subject to reservations. 67 Because reciprocity is the cornerstone of contentious jurisdiction, the
defendant nation need defend only to the extent that its declaration
overlaps or coincides with the declaration of the plaintiff nation. 68
For example, in submitting to compulsory jursidiction, the United
States reserved the right to exclude the Court's jurisdiction over matters "which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America, as determined by the United States of
America." 69 Practically, this reservation, the Connally Amendment,
allows the United States to consent to the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction on a
case by case basis. 7 0 More importantly, any nation sued by the

67. Various reservations are inserted in declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. These reservations either make ratification a condition of acceptance (Belgium, Liberia), set a time limit often subject to a notice of termination of
the court's jurisdiction after time has expired (Denmark, Japan, Liberia), exclude
certain disputes in which the parties have agreed to other methods of resolution
(Australia, Austria, India. Israel, United States), or exclude disputes arising before
jurisdiction was accepted (Finland, Honduras). [1978-19791 I.C.J.Y.B. 56-86 (1979).
68. See Interhandel, 119591 I.C.J. 6, 23; Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
[1957] I.C.J. 125, 145; Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. 9, 23-24; Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co., [1952] I.C.J. 93, 103; Electricity Co. of Sofia & Bulgaria, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 77, at 80-82; I. Brownlie, supra note 14, at 701; S. Rosenne 1973, supra
note 15, at 71-72. The I C.J., however, has taken jurisdiction when the pledge of
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction has expired. See Nottebohm, [1953] 1.C.J. 111,
120, 123.
69. 61 Stat. 1218; T.I.A.S. No. 1598; see note 65 supra. This amendment was
accepted only after a great deal of debate by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. See S. Rep. No. 1835, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946) ("The question of
what is properly a matter of international law . . .should be decided by the [I.C.J.l
... [A] reservation of the right of decision as to what are matters essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction would tend to defeat the purpose . . . of the proposed declaration and the purpose of ... the Statute of the [I.C.J.1"). In addition, the
American Bar Association advised that the Connally Amendment be deleted because
of its deleterious effect on the I.C.J.'s powers of compulsory jurisdiction. Jackson,
Jurisdiction of World Court: Association Urges New American Declaration, 33
A.B.A.J. 249 (1947); see Briggs, The United States and the International Court of
Justice: A Re-Examination, 53 Am J. Int'l L. 301 (1959); Humphrey, The United
States, the World Court and the Connally Amendment, 11 Va. J. Int'l L. 310 (1971);
Layton, The Dilemma of the World Court: The United States Reconsiders Conpulsory Jurisdiction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 323 (1960); Note, The Connally Amendment, The
Conflict between Nationalism and an Effective World Court, 53 Ky. L.J. 164 (1964).
For commentary favoring the Connally Amendment, see Boyle, Proposed Repeal of
Connally Reservation-A Matter of Concern, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 317 (1960); Note, "As
Determined by the United States of America," 10 Am. U.L. Rev. 146 (1961). Liberia,
Malawi, Mexico, Philippines, Portugal, and the Sudan have inserted reservations
similar to the Connally Amendment. [1978-19791 I.C.J.Y. B. 72-82 (1979). Portugal's
extreme self judging clause will not allow jurisdiction over any disputes if notice is
given to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Id. at 80. For the texts of the
United States and Mexican reservations, see notes 65-66 supra.
70. See Letter from Eric H. Hager, as Agent for the United States, to the International Court of Justice, reprinted in Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, I.C.J. Plead-
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United States in the I.C.J. may assert the Connally Amendment in
its defense. 1
Even though the rule of law is clear, the difficulties of exercising
contentious jurisdiction over Mexico for the Ixtoc I spill seem insurmountable. Because Mexico has disclaimed responsibility for the spill,
express consent to the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction in this particular instance
is unlikely. 72 Furthermore, Mexico has not consented by a more
general treaty or agreement. 73 Finally, even with consent to compulsory jurisdiction, 74 the Connally Amendment provides Mexico
with a complete defense. 75 Unfortunately, without repeal or modification of the Connally Amendment, the I.C.J. will remain an ineffective judicial mechanism for the United States, even as to countries
that have consented to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J.
II.

SUIT IN UNITED STATES COURT

A. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Historical Context
Alternatively, suit may be brought in United States federal court
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the Act). 76
ings 676-77 (1960) (decision can be wholly arbitrary); H. Morgenthau, supra note 58,
at 276 (same).
71. Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, [1960] l.C.J. 146, 148 (U.S. claim dismissed
when Bulgaria asserted reciprocal operation of Connally Amendment); se Norwegian
Loans, [1957] I.C.J. 9, 24, 27 (I.C.J. had no jurisdiction over French claim when
Norway asserted France's "'essentially \within" clause); Goldie, The Connally Rserration: A Shield for an Adversary, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 277 (1962). Gross. Bulgaria
Invokes the Connally Ainenduient. 56 Ain. J. Int'l L. 357 (1962).
72. See note 52 supra.
73. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 62-68 supra and accompany'ing text.
75. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4). 1391(f). 1441(d). 1602-1611 (1976). For a
detailed discussion of the Act, see von Mehren. The Foreign Sovereign nmunities
Act of 1976, 17 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 33 (1978); Note, Sovereign linmnunity-Linits
of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 18 Harv. Int'l L.J. 429 (1977. Jurisdiction over transnational
polluters also arguably can be asserted under the objective territorial jurisdiction
theory, sometimes referred to as the universality principle, or under the protective
principle of jurisdiction. Ixtoc Hearings. supra note 1. at 2.51-54 (statement of Jordan
Paust). Under the first theory, jurisdiction exists over "acts done outside a geographic
jurisdiction, but which are intended to produce and [do produce] detrimental effects
within it. Those circumstances justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if
it had been present at the effect." United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635
(D.P.R. 1978); accord, Strassheim v. Daily. 221 U.S. 280, 28.5 (1911); United States
v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294, 1296 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pizarusso. 3S
F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968). Objective territorial jurisdiction, however, is considered only as a means of asserting jurisdiction over criminals.
See I. Brownlie, supra note 14, at 297; D. Greig. supra note 15. at 169-70; 1 C.
Hyde, supra note 32, at 798-804. Pollution damage, regardless of size, is probably
not a crime. Hence, jurisdiction would probably not exist under this theory. The
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The Act, essentially a federal long-arm statute, codifies the law of
sovereign immunity 77 and provides for both personal 7 8 and subjectmatter jurisdiction 79 over foreign nations. The Act may be used by
the United States government and by individual United States nationals.80

Previously, a foreign nation's immunity in a United States court 8 '
was determined by the State Department, which based decisions on

protective principle permits jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts if a significant national interest is at stake. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); see Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 5,19-50
(9th Cir.), cert. denied. 366 U.S. 948 (1961); United States v. Archer, 51 F. Stpp.
708, 709 (S.D. Cal. 1943). This protective principle, however, is usually limited to
crimes, such as espionage, sedition, or treason, that threaten the security of the nation. I. Brownlie, supra note 14, at 296-97, D. Greig, supra note 15, at 167-68.
77. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as FSIA Report], reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6605.
78. Id. at 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6606.
79. Id. at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6611.
80. Id. at 6-7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 660-05; see
Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the PlaintiffHis Day in
Court, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 543 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Day in Court],
81. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has ancient sources in the history of
western culture. See note 8 supra. The concept that no nation could interfere with
another nation's exercise of sovereign rights remained a basic premise of international
relations well into the nineteenth century. The United States first espoused support
of absolute sovereign immunity in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 135 (1812). The zenith in the United States of this doctrine was reached
in 1895, when Attorney General Harmon, in response to Mexico's protest against
diversion of the Rio Grande, stated that "the rules, principles, and precedents of
international law impose no liability or obligation upon the United States." 21 Op,
Att'y Gen. 274, 283 (1895). Ironically, shortly before denying Mexico's appeal, the
United States had appealed to Great Britain to ensure that Canadian waterways
would not be diverted and damage the United States. Unlike the United States reaction to Mexican requests, the British government expressed willingness to provide
those injured with both damages and injunctive relief. 2 J. Moore, Digest of International Law 451-52 (1906). Increasing commercial activity and economic interdependence of the nations of the industrial revolution led the United States to adopt a
more limited view of sovereign immunity. J. Sweeney, The International Law of
Sovereign Immunity 20, 37 (1963). A distinction began to emerge between jure iperii, purely public acts, and jure gestionis, private acts in which the sovereign acted
as a private individual or corporate entity. Letter from Jack B. Tate to Philip B.
Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952). Tate's letter
formally adopted the private-public distinction to the absolute sovereign immunity
doctrine and officially sanctioned the judicial practice of seeking State Department
consent before exercising jurisdiction over foreign nations. Id. at 985; see, e.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir.) (no immunity for private
acts), cert. denied,. 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Pan Am. Tankers Corp, v. Vietnam, 296 F.
Supp. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (immunity as to sovereign acts (ure imperil) but not
private acts Yure gestionis)); Harris & Co. Advertising v Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687, 690
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) Yure gestionis).
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political, rather than legal, considerations. 8 2 These essentially subjective decisions were inconsistent 8 3 and often left the plaintiff with-

82. FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 7-8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6605-06; see note 77 supra. This practice arguably stemmed from Marshall's conviction that the determination whether to grant jurisdiction should be "disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the attorney of the United States." Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812); see Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945) (jurisdiction denied because of potential embarrassment of
the executive branch); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578. 588 (1943) (same); Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v.Embassy of S. Viet Nam. 275 F. Supp. 860. 860-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1967
(same). The Court in Peru held that a plea for sovereign immunity by the State
Department "must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the
political arm of the Government." 318 U.S. at 589. Unfortunately, the Tate Letter
failed to clarify United States policy on sovereign immunity primarily because the
definitions of public and private acts were imprecise. This inadequacy, coupled with
continued judicial deference to State Department fiat, left United States policy
frought with ambiguities. See Letter from Robert Ingersoll & Harold Tyler, Jr. to
Rep. Albert (Oct. 31, 1975), reprinted in FSIA Report. supra note 77, at 45. reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6634; Lauterpacht. The Probh',n
of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States. 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 220. 264-70
(1951). See also European Convention on State Immunity. May 16. 1972. reprinted
in 11 Int'l Legal Materials 470 (1972) (European acceptance of restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity). Some commentators had argued that the decision should be
made by the judiciary. E.g., Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of its
Functions?, 40 Am. J. Int'l L. 168, 169 (1946); Moore. The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings. 31 Fordham L. Rev. 277. 302 (1962). Richard.
Sovereign Inmunity -Proposed Statutory Elimination of State Department RoleAttachment, Service of Process, and Execution -Senate Bill .566. 9.3d Congress. 1st
Session (1973), 15 Harv. Int'l L.J. 157 (1974); Day in Court, supra note 80, at 550;
Note, The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary: The State Department as
the Supreme Court of InternationalLate, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 389. 389-97 (196S).
Other commentators had argued that the immunity decision should be within executive control. E.g., Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions:
Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 Cornell L.Q. 461, 462
(1963); Franck, The Courts, the State Department and National Policy: A Criterion
for Judicial Abdication, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 1101, 1104 (1960).
83. For a survey of the general confusion generated by State Department suggestions, see Ocean Trans. Co. v. Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967)
(sovereign's purchase of a boat not immune); The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D.
Wash. 1946) (United States government not immune for merchant ships); Sullivan '.
Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y.) (Brazil immune from claims arising from
bond sales), affd, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941); Chemical Natural Resources. Inc. v.
Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (Venezuela cancelled contracts. State Department recommendation to dismiss accepted), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 822 (19661. In
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). creditors of Cuban nationals sought to attach a Cuban vessel. The court accepted a State Department
suggestion to dismiss the suit. Id. at 26. The decision, however, may have been
affected by the sensitive, on-going negotiations for the return of a hijacked United
States airliner from Cuba. Day in Court, supra note 80. at 549; Note. Doctrines of
Sovereign Immunity and Act of State- Conflicting Consequences of State Departinent Intervention, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 167, 170-71 (1972).
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out redress. 84 By entrusting this decision to the judiciary,8 5 Congress sought to guarantee, irrespective of possible adverse effects on
United States diplomatic relations, a day in court for parties injured
by a foreign nation engaged in commercial endeavors. 86

B. The Act and Oil Spills
Before a federal court will exercise jurisdiction under the Act, the
plaintiff must show that one of the Act's exceptions to sovereign immunity 87 applies to the facts of the case 88 and that due process is not
84. "[Ihe current practice [of State Department suggestion] has caused inequitable results for private litigants as a result of departmental suggestions of immunity in
commercial cases." Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign
States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
59 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (statement of Peter Troobof). "A
private party who deals with a foreign government entity cannot be certain of having
his day in court to resolve an ordinary legal dispute." Id. at 27 (statement of Monroe
Leigh); accord, P. Jessup, The Use of International Law 83 (1954).
85. FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6606. State Department decisionmaking in these situations was thought
to prevent unnecessary embarrassment to the executive branch and engender ftwer
diplomatic controversies with foreign nations. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of
S. Viet Nam, 275 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Letter from Robert Ingersoll &
Harold Tyler, Jr. to Rep. Albert (Oct. 31 1975), reprinted in FSIA Report, supra
note 77, at 45, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6634. "These
peculiarly judicial questions require resolution on the basis of specified criteria and
subsequent interpretative decisions, As a political and policymaking Agency, the Department of State is an inappropriate forum for dispassionate determination of the
commercial/noncommercial question and related issues. Moreover, . . . it Is illequipped to perform that judicial function." House Hearings, supra note 84, at 58
(statement of Peter Troobofi); accord, id. at 31 (statement of Bruno Ristau).
86. See note 84 supra.
87. Exceptions to sovereign immunity are found in 28. U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)(1976)
(waiver), id. § 1605(a)(2) (commercial activities), id. § 1605(a)(3) (expropriation
claims), id. § 1605(a)(4) (litigation involving immovable inherited and gift property),
id. § 1605(a)(5) (non-commercial torts), and id. § 1605(b) (maritime liens). Section
1605(a)(3) provides a mechanism for redress from foreign expropriation. It allows
jurisdiction over claims for property taken by a foreign nation without payment "in
violation of international law." 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976); e.g., Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). Section 1605(a)(5) was designed to
provide compensation for injuries resulting from traffic or automobile accidents. FSIA
Report, supra note 77, at 21, reprinted in [19761 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6620. It is, however, broadly defined to exclude from immunity all "non-commercial
torts," and indeed, various tort claims are expected to be brought under this section.
See Letelier v. Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980).
88. "For personal jurisdiction to exist under section 1330(b), the claim must first
of all be one over which the district courts have original jurisdiction tinder section
1330(a), meaning a claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.
Significantly, each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections 1605-1607, requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United States, or an express or
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violated.8 9 Because offshore pollution involves transboundary injury
resulting from an extraterritorial act, the plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of section 1605(a)(2). 90 That section provides that a
foreign nation is not outside the jurisdiction of the United States,
even when the injury causing act occurs outside the United States, if
the act is "in connection with a commercial activity . .. that ...

causes a direct effect in the United States."91 Thus, the Act applies
if the defendant is a "foreign state," the activity giving rise to liability
is "commercial," and the activity has a "direct effect" in the United
92
States.
implied waiver by the foreign state of its immunity from jurisdiction. These immunity
provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before our
courts can exercise personal jurisdiction. Besides incorporating these jurisdictional
contacts by reference, section 1330(b) also satisfies the due process requirement of
adequate notice by prescribing that proper service be made under section 1608 of the
bill. Thus sections 1330(b), 1608, and 1605-1607 are all carefully interconnected.'*
FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 13-14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6612.
89. This Note evaluates the statutory requirements under the Act. Although the
legislative history indicates that satisfaction of the statutory requirements creates a
sufficient nexus between the foreign state's commercial activities and the United
States, it also specifies that the Act's application should be consistent wvith the principles in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). and their progeny. FSIA Report. supra
note 77, at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6612. The
Supreme Court has developed an effects test that permits extension of jurisdiction for
acts occurring outside the forum that have an effect within the fornun, provided the
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). Further, the effects doctrine has been applied extraterritorially in situations
similar to transboundary pollution. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemns. Corp., 401 U.S. 493,
500-01 (1971) (allowed jurisdiction over foreign state defendant for interstate pollution
because it would not be unfair to sue defendant where damage occurred). Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1979) (same). cert. granted. 444
U.S. 961 (1979) (No. 79-408). See generally Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction over
Foreign States: The "Direct Effect" Provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976-Carey v. National Oil Corporation. 13 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 633 (1979).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). Section 1605(a)(2) provides an exception to immunity for commercial activities having a nexus with the United States. This is the
relevant provision because it allows jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the
United States that have effects in the United States. Section 1605(a)(5), the only other
arguably relevant section, is inapposite because it requires that both the injurious
effect and the act occur within the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605a)(5) (1976).
91. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
92. Courts generally follow this three-step analysis. See, e.g., Carey v. National
Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Perez v. Bahamas, 482 F. Supp.
1208 (D.D.C. 1980); Harris v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
Upton v. Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.
1979); National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597
F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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A "foreign state" is defined as a "political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 9 3 The definition of agency or instrumentality expressly includes a corporation
when a majority of its shares or a proprietary interest is controlled by
a foreign nation. 94 In Carey v. National Oil Corp.,9 5 for example, a
corporation wholly-owned by the Libyan government, the Libyan National Oil Company (LNOC), was held to be a foreign nation for
jurisdictional immunity purposes. 96 The Pemex/Mexican government
government
relationship is identical; like LNOC, Pemex is wholly
97
owned and should be a foreign nation under the Act.
The second prerequisite, "commercial activity," is defined as
"either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." 9 8 This requirement distinguishes purely
governmental, public, or sovereign acts from government acts of a
commercial or private nature. 99 Prior to the Act, this distinction had
been frustrated when courts emphasized the purpose, not the nature,
of the activity. 10 0 Congress, however, emphasized the nature of the
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976).
an organ of a foreign state or politi94. Id. § 1603(b)(2) (1976). A foreign state "is
cal subdivision thereof, or [a corporation,] a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof," Id.
95. 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
96. Id. at 676 n. 1; see Geveke & Co. v. Kompania Di Awa I Elektrisidat DI
Korsou N.V., 482 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Harris v. VAO Intourlst. 481
F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Corporacion Venezolana v. Vintero Sales
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel,
461 F. Supp. 384, 394 (D. Del. 1978).
97. 592 F.2d at 676; see note 1 supra. "Itis true that Pemex is engaged in a
commercial business, the operation in Mexico of an oil company for profit." D'Angelo
v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (D. Del. 1976), affd, 564 F.2d 89
(3d Cir. 1977).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
99. FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6615; e.g., Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849,
855 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Marshall recognized this theory in holding a nation responsible
for private acts in Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904 (1824). He stated that "'when a government becomes a partner in any trading
so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of Its
company, it divests itself,
sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen." Id. at 907. For a modern
rendition of Marshall's conclusion, see House Hearings, supra note 84, at 27 (statement of Monroe Leigh) ("[W]hen the foreign state enters the marketplace or when it
acts as a private party, there is no justification in modern international law for allowing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the agreements which it may
breach or the accidents which it may cause."). See generally Lauterpacht, slipra note
82. The notion of limited sovereign immunity is based on this distinction. See note
81 supra and accompanying text.
100. FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6613. In Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), the
United States Supreme Court held that a state-owned ship operated by the state to
transport cargo for hire was immune from suit. The court reasoned that whenever an
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endeavor when it defined commercial activities to include those that
private individuals ordinarily pursue,
regardless of whether a nation is
0
acting in the particular case.' '
Offshore drilling seems clearly within this definition. The le'slative
history of the Act includes a "mineral extraction company as an
example of those activities within the "broad spectrum of [commercial] endeavor." 102 Courts have long defined "mineral" to encompass
other resources, including oil. '0 3 Additionally, courts have construed
"commercial activity" broadly to include contracting for oil, 104 agreeing to letters of credit, 10 5 operating hotels, cargo ships 106 or air10 8
ports, 10 7 and selling newspapers.
Two cases, however, arguably preclude the finding that offshore oil
drilling is commercial. In Yessenin-Volpin v. NoLosti Press Agency, 109
the court held that the publication of allegedly libelous articles in
Russian periodicals was not commercial activity 110 because the Soviet
instrumentality of a nation is engaged in furthering a public purpose it may not be
held accountable to private parties in a United States court. Because the Court found
that the purpose of the Pesaro w-as to further the trade of the Italian people and thus
add revenue to the nation, it declined to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at
575-76; see note 81 supra (prior to the Act, courts distinguished between public and
private acts).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976); see Gittler v. German Info. Center, 95 Misc. 2d
788, 790, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (cultural center immune from wage
claim because the center was governmental in nature due to its function of promoting
the foreign nation in the United States). Emphasizing the nature, not the purpose.
can bring acts within the scope of sovereign immunity protection. In Perez v.
Bahamas, 482 F. Supp. 1208 (D.D.C. 1980), an allegation that police enforcement of
a Bahamian fishing law constituted "'commercial activitv" %as held unfounded. Id. at
1210. Although the activity may have had some commercial goal or purpose-the
protection of Bahamian fishing resources for Bahamian commercial fisherman-the
court held that the nature of the act was not commercial and, therefore, wvas immune. Id. at 1211.
102. FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6615. Airlines, state trading corporations. and export associations are
also included. Id., reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6614.
103. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 534 (1903). MacDonald v.
United States, 119 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1941), modified and aff'd sub nora. Great
N. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
104. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(implicitly found a commercial activity, but held not sufficiently connected to the
United States to permit jurisdiction).
105. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1294-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (by implication).
106. Bechring Int'l v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 390 (D.N.J.
1979).
107. Upton v. Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978) (by implication). affd
mem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
108. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849. 856 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (dictum).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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government collaborated in, rather than contracted for, the publication."' The court reasoned that potential liability for publishing official government commentaries "would contravene the spirit of
sovereign immunity as well as the letter of the Immunities Act."112
Similarly, in a suit to enjoin OPEC price fixing, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. OPEC,1 13 the court determined that the challenged activity should be defined narrowly as the control of production, not the fixing of price. 114 Because only a sovereign can control
the "terms and conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource" from its territory, the challenged activity was held purely
governmental, and hence, noncommercial. 115
Both of these cases involve commercial activity that traditionally
has been afforded sovereign immunity protection. Refusing to apply
the Act mechanically, both courts apparently judged the overall
character of the sovereign's activity within the spirit of sovereign immunity. The implicit reasoning is that, because the United States
1 17
would be immune from suit for defamation 116 or price-fixing,
foreign nations should be extended comparable immunity. 1 18 Offshore
111. "[A] given entity may at some times engage in commercial activities, on which
it would not be immune, and at other times take actions 'whose essential nature Is
public or governmental,' on which it would be immune." Id. at 855.
112. Id. at 856. The court used the "in connection" language to avoid mechanical
application of the Act. Although the activity seemed to be commercial for the purposes of the Act, the court concluded that jurisdiction over the Russian news agency
was improper when the periodicals were actually publications of the Soviet government. Id. The court's determination that the claim was not sufficiently connected to
the activity probably was made because the Soviet Union, although acting in a manner which would be considered to be commercial by a United States court, was
acting within the "spirit" of sovereign immunity. See id.
113. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
114. Id. at 567.
115. Id.; see FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6615. The OPEC court admitted expert testimony that tended
to prove that the price variations of OPEC oil were not directly caused by price
fixing. Rather, price fluctuation was an indirect result of OPEC's control of supply.
This extrinsic cause obviated the need to consider the activity as price fixing, which
clearly can be performed by private individuals. 477 F Supp. at 566-67. The plaintiff
in OPEC, however, challenged price fixing, not the exercise of control over supply.
Id. at 558. Thus, OPEC's factual determination is questionable.
116. The United States generally waived its immunity from suit, 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1976), but retained its immunity for certain intentional torts, including libel and
slander. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
117. Government price fixing does not lead to antitrust liability. See, e.g., Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air
Bd., 492 F.2d 1258, 1259 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v.
Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1970).
118. See notes 109-15 supra and accompanying text; cf. notes 68-75 supra and
accompanying text (reciprocity is a basic principle of international law); note 120 infra
(broad jurisdictional reach of United States antitrust law criticized as an unfair imposition on foreign nations)-
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drilling, however, is not within the spirit of sovereign immunity. Be1 19
cause the United States would be liable for offshore drilling,
foreign nations also should be liable.
The final criterion requires that the activity have "direct effects" in
the United States. 120 No precise definition, however, exists within

119. The United States would be liable for damages caused by governmental
offshore drilling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
120. This criterion demonstrates the relationship between statutory exceptions to
sovereign immunity for commercial activities and due process requirements. FSIA
Report, supra note 77, at 17, reprinted in (1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6615. It is unclear whether satisfaction of the statute's requirement of "direct effects"
satisfies due process requirements as well. In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court, by accepting the locus of the
effect as the controlling criterion, id. at 1299, implicitly accepted that satisfaction of
direct effects also satisfies the due process requirements of minimum contacts. In
Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979), the court stated that the
facts of the case did not fulfill minimum contacts "and thus cannot reach the level of
'direct effects."' Id. at 677. This implies that, if direct effects criteria are met,
minimum contact requirements are also satisfied. In the most recent case construing
the application of the Act, Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Nigeria, No. 77 Civ. 2348 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 19, 1980), the court's initial consideration was whether the sovereign w'as immune. If the sovereign is not immune, reasonable contacts with the forum are still
necessary to create both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. id., slip op. at 20.
This determination, however, necessarily requires that the contacts with the forum be
reasonable. Id. at 28. The reasonableness standard in Nikkei is the minimum contacts
standard of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 28 (1980).
Minimum contacts analysis evaluates the burden placed on the defendant in litigating
in the forum, the interest of the forum in adjudicating the dispute, and the plaintifs
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. 444 U.S. at 292; No. 77 Cir.
2348, slip op. at 28. If only minimum contacts standards control, jurisdiction over
transboundary polluters is clear. Damages in a forum of $580,000,000 create a strong
interest in adjudicating the dispute. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. The
burden on the defendant is not great. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
Finally, the plaintiff has no other effective and convenient relief. See note 55 supra.
See generally Note, The Nikkei Case: Toward a More Uniform Application oj the
Direct Effect Clause of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 Fordham Int'l L.J.
(1980). An imprecise variation of the effects doctrine under the Act is the effects
doctrine used in antitrust law. See B. Hawk. United States, Common Market, and
International Antitrust 21 (1979). The limits of antitrust and constitutional jurisdiction
probably were delineated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). Judge Learned Hand formulated the "intent and effect" test in
which an intent to and an effect on the imports or exports of the United States makes
extraterritorial application of antitrust law appropriate. Id. at 423. These criteria have
been criticized as inconsistent with international law, an unreasonable imposition of
American political and economic values on other nations, and unclear in application.
Jennings, ExtraterritorialEffects of Antitrust, 1957 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 146; Stanford,
Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View from
Abroad, 11 Cornell Int'l L.J. 195, 210-11 (1978). See generally B. Hawk, supra, at
19-59. Later cases have revised the standard. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976) C'not limited
to trade restraints which have both a direct and substantial effect on [United States]
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the context of the Act.121 The only guidance provided by Congress
is that the Act is patterned after the District of Columbia long-arm
statute 122 and that "direct effects" criteria should be applied consisSecond, of the Foreign Relatent with section 18 of the Restatement,
23
tions Law of the United States.1
As construed by the courts, the District of Columbia statute requires that either the tortious act and its effect occur within the
District 124 or the injury occur within the jurisdiction and the defendant have "regular business contacts" with the District. 125 If this
statute is applied rigidly in the context of the Act, transnational pollution injury might not meet the direct effects criterion. The first section clearly could not be satisfied because the act that caused the
injury occurred outside the territorial waters of the United States.' 20
Meeting the requirements of the second section would depend on
whether the firm responsible for the oil spill has "regular business
12 7
contacts." Sufficient business contacts probably exist over Pemex,

foreign commerce"); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504,
592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ("a conspiracy ... which affects American commerce"); United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ("a
direct and influencing effect on trade"), modified and aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
121. FSIA Report, supra note 77, at 19, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6618.
122. Id. at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6612.
123. Id. at 19, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6618.
124. Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (construing D.C.
Code Encyl. § 13-423(a)(3) (West Supp. 1970)). In Margoles, defamation published in
Wisconsin caused injury in the District of Columbia. Id. at 1213. The court interpreted "tortious injury" restrictively to include both the act and the injury. Thus, a
connection with the forum greater than the act's injurious consequences was necessary before the court would exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 1219-20.
125. Aiken v. Lustine Chevrolet, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 883, 885 (D.D.C. 1975) (construing D.C. Code Encyl. § 13-423(a)(4) (West Supp. 1970)).
126. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
127. Although the District's tortious injury requirement is rather restrictive, the
District's "transacts business" requirement is interpreted to extend jurisdiction to the
farthest reaches permitted under the due process clause. Margoles v. Johns, 483
F.2d 1212, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Dorothy K. Winston & Co. v. Town Heights
Dev., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (D.D.C. 1979). Additionally, the "regular business contacts" requirement permits jurisdiction even when defendant's contacts bear
no relation to the tort that forms the basis of the cause of action. Aiken v. Lustine
Chevrolet, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 883, 885 (D.D.C. 1975). Pemex may have satisfied the
District's statute because of Pemex's long history of commerce with the United
States. S.T. Tringali Co. v. Tug Pemex XV, 274 F. Supp. 227, 230 (S.D. Tex. 1967)
(Pemex is "constantly sending its vessels into American ports."); F.W. Stone Eng'r
Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945) (various construction contracts). This commercial connection with the forum will be substantially augmented
by the purchase of 120 offshore drilling rigs from the United States. See note 9
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but possibly not over other nations participating in offshore oil drilling. Courts, however, do not universally apply the District of Columbia statute. In fact, some never mention it at all. 12 Thus, the
extent to vhich compliance with the District of Columbia statute is
required is unclear.
The Act also incorporates the direct effects standard of section
18(b)1 29 of the Restatement, which provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and
causes an effect within its territory, if ...

(i) the conduct and its

effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
30

systems. l

Courts, in construing "substantial," "direct," and 'foreseeable," determine "direct effects" primarily by the locus of the injury. 13 1 In
Harris v. VAO Intourist,1 32 the court held that the death of a United
States national while abroad was necessarily indirect.133 Something
supra. Pemex also contracted with Sedco, Inc. for the bareboat charter of the drilling
rig involved in this particular accident. Ixtoc Hearings, stipra note 1. at 20 (statement
of Stephen Mahood). All of these connections lead to the conclusion that Pemex has

satisfied the business contacts requirement by purposefully availing itself of the laws
of the United States. See Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Nigeria, No. 77 Civ. 2348. slip op. at
24-30 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1980) (letter of credit contract signed with U.S. bank sufficient contact); National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 637 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (same), affd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). cf. note 120 supra (contacts are
constitutionally sufficient to %%arrant exercise of jurisdiction).
128. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curLun); Nikkei
Int'l, Inc. v. Nigeria, No. 77 Cir. 2348 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1980); see Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Thu Verlinden
court discussed the District of Columbia long-arm statute, but not in the context of
direct effects, and concluded that "the District's statute is only a guide to interpreting
the Act, not a binding directive." Id.
129. In Harris v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the court
determined that § 18(b) of the Restatement is controlling because § 18(al's language is
unconstitutionally broad. Id. at 1063.
130. Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18 (1965).
131. Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Nigeria, No. 77 Cir. 2348, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
19, 1980); Verlinden B.\. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Harris v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056. 106.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
132. 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
133. Id. at 1062; Upton v. Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978). aff'd. 607 F.2d
494 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Upton court, in a wrongful death action, analogized the
Act's long-arm provision to the District of Columbia long-arm statute and found that
the deaths or injuries to Americans abroad did not have "direct effects" on the United
States. Id. at 266. The court stated that "'[t]he common sense interpretation of a
'direct effect' is one which has no intervening element, but. rather, flows in a straight
line without deviation or interruption." Id. Because the fact of death, rather than
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more substantial and direct than the effect on grieving survivors was
necessary to exercise jurisdiction. Furthermore, the effects of defamation 134 and the breach of a letter of credit 135 were deemed to be
substantial and direct when the United States was the locus of the
injury.' 36 Under the rationale of these cases, the standards of section
18 would be met in transboundary pollution cases. The spoilation of
the Texas coast with its concommitant damages is a more "substantial" impact than the consequences of a breach of a letter of credit 137
or a defamatory remark.1 38 Moreover, the locus requirement is satisfied because the United States directly incurs the injury. 13 9 As with
the District of Columbia statute, however, courts have not universally
applied the Restatement0 and have reached decisions without ever ex14
pressly mentioning it.
In most instances of transboundary pollution, the jurisdictional requirements of both the District of Columbia long-arm statute and section 18 will be met.14 1 In the instances when the standards of the
District of Columbia are not met, jurisdiction under the Act is still
appropriate because the District of Columbia statute guides and does
not bind.142 Any doubt as to jurisdiction for transboundary pollution
is dispelled by the legislative history of the Act, which cites Trail
1 44
Smelter 143 as an example of injury that will be redressed.

Iran's tortious act, caused the injury in the United States, the court reasoned that
jurisdiction was not permissible. Id. As in Harris, the situs of the injurious effect was
controlling. Id.
134. See Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Yessenin court suggested that injury to the good name and
reputation of a United States resident caused by the writing and publication of articles outside the United States would constitute a "direct effect" for the Act's purposes. Id.
135. In National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affl,
597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), the breach of a New York letter of credit payable to a
New York beneficiary would have met the statutory requirement of "direct effects"
because the alleged injury occurred in the United States and was substantial. Id.at
637; accord, Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Nigeria, No. 77 Civ. 2348 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1980).
136. Verlinden B-.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
137. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 1-2 supra.
140. Upton v. Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978). aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
141. See notes 127, 137-39 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 128 supra.
143. For a discussion of Trail Smelter, see notes 18-27 supra and accompanying
text.
144. Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the Subconmn.
on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973" (statement of Charles Bro\ver). "There is also no immunity
if the case involves [a]n act outside the territory of the United States in connection
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CONCLUSION

The transboundary pollution situation presents unique problems for
both the international and domestic judicial systems. Although redress is available for injured United States nationals under the Act,
international regulation of pollution creating activities is critically
needed before the deterioration of the marine environment exceeds
man's ability to provide effective restitution. A policy relying on mere
financial compensation is, at best, logically indefensible and, at worst,
reprehensibly short-sighted. Conclusion of the Conference on the
Law of the Sea may well provide the prescient global policy that will
allow seabed exploitation without irreparable harm to the environment.

William J. Macdonald

with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act has a direct
effect within the territory of the United States.' This exception would embrace extraterritorial conduct having effects within the United States such as an action for
pollution of the air by a factory operated commercially by a foreign state. It is. in
fact, a situation which we have had on our borders from time to time." Id. See also
Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Laws of the United States § 18 (1965) (jurisdiction appropriate to redress transboundary injury). See generally. Note. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Over Foreign States: The "Direct Effect" Provision of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-Carey v. National Oil Corporation. 13 J. Int'l L. &
Econ. 633 (1979).

